A witness cannot be cross-examined on a collateral matter if the purpose of that cross-examination merely is to discredit the witness by subsequently admitting evidence to contradict the witness's testimony. Compare State v. Burdge, 295 Or 1, 6 n 3, 664 P2d 1076 (1983) (a witness may be impeached by evidence that contradicts the witness's testimony on any independently relevant fact). Applying that principle to this case, the trial court properly excluded the evidence, because defense counsel's stated purpose merely was to lay a foundation to contradict Bassett's testimony.

Defendant next argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that the testimony of Bassett's ex-wife was not relevant under OEC 401 to demonstrate Bassett's bias against him.⁽¹⁾ OEC 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence that has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." The rule establishes a "very low threshold" for the admission of evidence. State v. Hampton, 317 Or 251, 255 n 8, 855 P2d 621 (1993). Evidence is relevant so long as the inference desired by the proponent is reasonable, even if the evidence also could support a contradictory inference. Hampton, 317 Or at 255.

At the outset, we must determine the appropriate standard of review for trial court determinations of relevance under OEC 401 -- a question that previously has not been addressed expressly by this court. In considering that question, we note the distinction between the determination of relevance under OEC 401 and the question of admissibility under OEC 403. A decision to exclude evidence under OEC 403 is reserved to the trial court's discretion. State v. Moore, 324 Or 396, 407, 927 P2d 1073 (1996); State v. Hubbard, 297 Or 789, 798, 688 P2d 1311 (1984). That is so because application of OEC 403 may allow for more than one legally correct outcome. Hubbard, 297 Or at 794 n 2. For example, in some cases, the record may support either the admission or exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence under OEC 403, and neither result legally would be incorrect. See Carter v. Moberly, 263 Or 193, 201, 501 P2d 1276 (1972) (so stating in a civil case).

Relevance determinations under OEC 401, by contrast, can yield only one correct answer; evidence either is relevant or it is not. Under OEC 401, if evidence logically is relevant, a trial court has no discretion to label it as irrelevant. See generally Christopher B. Mueller and Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence, 420 (2d ed 1994) (because determinations of relevance are based upon logic and experience, there is little reason to defer to the trial court). Accordingly, we conclude that we must review determinations of relevance for errors of law.

We now apply the foregoing standard of review to this case. Assuming that Bassett did, in fact, threaten a defense witness, it is unclear from the record whether that threat was inspired by his alleged animosity for the witness, for defendant, or both. However, it is indisputable that Bassett's threat, if successful, would have eliminated a defense witness, thereby possibly increasing the likelihood of defendant's conviction. Thus, although evidence of the threat could have supported more than one theory of bias, the evidence had a tendency to make the existence of bias against defendant more probable than it would have been if the evidence were excluded. It follows that the evidence was relevant under OEC 401. The trial court's conclusion to the contrary was error.

Having concluded that the trial court erred in excluding the threat evidence, we now must determine whether that error requires reversal of defendant's conviction. Evidentiary error is not presumed to be prejudicial. OEC 103(1). An adverse verdict may be affirmed, notwithstanding the evidentiary error, if there is little likelihood that the error affected the verdict. State v. Hansen, 304 Or 169, 180, 743 P2d 157 (1987).

As to evidence of bias, in Hubbard, this court stated:

"It is error for the trial judge to exclude evidence which establishes sufficient facts from which the bias or interest of a witness may be inferred. If in the context of the entire trial, the exclusion is prejudicial to the party who sought to introduce the impeachment evidence, it is reversible error."

297 Or at 798. Where, as here, an error results in the exclusion of bias evidence, the specific issue is whether the error denied the jury "an adequate opportunity to assess the credibility of a witness whose credibility is important to the outcome of the trial." Id. at 800. Thus, under Hubbard, the trial court's error in this case would be harmless if either: (1) despite the exclusion, the jury nonetheless had an adequate opportunity to assess Bassett's credibility; or (2) Bassett's credibility was not important to the outcome of the trial.

We first consider whether the jury had an adequate opportunity to assess Bassett's credibility. The jury already had heard substantial evidence of Bassett's bias when the threat evidence was excluded. In addition to the previously discussed impeachment evidence, defendant also presented testimony from Bassett's ex-wife that Bassett hated defendant and wanted to "get" defendant "busted." However, that evidence, at the most, established only that Bassett was hostile toward defendant. If that had been the only evidence admitted, then the jury might have believed that, despite his ill feelings toward defendant, Bassett nonetheless had obeyed the law and testified honestly. By contrast, the threat evidence might have suggested that Bassett was willing to act unlawfully based upon his feelings toward defendant in order to undermine the fairness of defendant's trial. In other words, the jury might have concluded that, if Bassett unlawfully had threatened a defense witness, he also would have had no compunction about lying under oath. Thus, the threat evidence could have informed the jury's credibility assessment of Bassett in a way that the evidence of Bassett's ill feelings might not have.

We think it significant that the threat evidence demonstrated an attempt by Bassett to undermine the legal proceeding itself. In our view, that suggests bias qualitatively different in nature from that suggested by the evidence of Bassett's ill feelings toward defendant. Thus, we cannot conclude that the jury had an adequate opportunity to assess Bassett's credibility absent consideration of evidence of Bassett's alleged threat.

Next, we consider whether Bassett's credibility was important to the outcome of the trial. "If numerous other witnesses testified to a given fact, then the exclusion of evidence of a witness' bias or interest who testified to the same fact might be 'harmless error' in the context of a given trial." Hubbard, 297 Or at 800. However, such an error would not be harmless "where the impeached witness is the sole witness on a given issue and there is no corroborating evidence." Id. at 800-01. We begin by reviewing the evidence presented against defendant.

Defendant was charged with possession and delivery of a controlled substance on or about December 3, 1993. Because both parties presented evidence relating to events several months before his arrest, the trial court ruled that defendant could be convicted based upon any facts alleged to have occurred between March 1 and December 9, 1993.

The state's first two witnesses were police officers: Officer Woodruff, a City of Tillamook police officer, and Detective Nafziger, an Oregon State Police detective specializing in narcotics. Woodruff testified that Aerni, a friend and former roommate of defendant's, had told Woodruff that she had obtained methamphetamine from defendant and that defendant was the primary drug dealer in her town. Woodruff testified that, on December 3, 1993, he went to defendant's apartment to investigate a report that defendant had drugs in his apartment and unlawfully possessed a firearm. According to Woodruff, when he arrived at defendant's apartment, defendant was wearing a coat, which defendant took off and set down on a piece of furniture in the apartment. Nafziger and another officer then arrived and searched defendant's apartment with defendant's consent. Nafziger found several syringes, some used, in a drawer in defendant's bedroom. Nafziger also found nine one-quarter gram bags of methamphetamine in the pocket of defendant's jacket. Although defendant admitted that he had worn the jacket for several hours before the search, he denied any knowledge of the methamphetamine and claimed that someone must have put it there in an effort to frame him. Defendant later presented evidence that Bassett had possession of the jacket for some period during the week before defendant's arrest. Defendant also denied any knowledge of the syringes in his bedroom.

Next, Nafziger testified that he had seen what he believed to be needle marks on defendant's arm. Defendant offered no explanation for the marks at the time but, at trial, suggested that perhaps there was a rash on his arm from working with fiberglass.

Nafziger also testified that, at the time of his arrest, defendant had $1,768 in cash in his wallet, and his checkbook recorded recent balances at least as high as $8,000 -- despite the fact that he had been unemployed for several months. Defendant explained that those balances were attributable to his recent receipt of inheritance income. Finally, Nafziger testified that defendant had admitted selling a $20 bag of methamphetamine on behalf of his roommate. According to Nafziger, defendant then recanted, stating that he had not delivered the drugs himself, but merely had taken the money for his roommate, who earlier had delivered the drugs.

Bassett was the state's third witness. He testified that he had helped defendant find a drug supplier so that defendant could operate as a drug dealer. He also testified that he had purchased drugs from and used drugs with defendant during the period from June 1993 until defendant's arrest in December 1993.

The state's fourth witness was Aerni, who testified to the following: Bassett had obtained his methamphetamine from defendant; defendant was selling drugs for a living when she met him; and, while living with defendant for several months before his arrest, she had observed him selling drugs and had accompanied him on trips to buy as much as three ounces of methamphetamine. According to Aerni, defendant bought and sold six to eight ounces of methamphetamine each week and divided that amount into one-quarter gram bags. She claimed that defendant often paid more than $800 for an ounce of methamphetamine and typically more than doubled his investment by reselling the one- quarter gram bags. Finally, Aerni testified that defendant had injected methamphetamine on December 2, 1993, the day before his early morning arrest, and that, several hours before his arrest, defendant had stated that his drug supply was low and that he planned to buy two more ounces that night.

Bassett's testimony contains only two statements that conceivably could have contributed to defendant's conviction. First, Bassett testified that he had helped defendant find a drug supplier so that defendant could operate as a drug dealer. That testimony, however, would not by itself have supported defendant's conviction -- it merely invited an inference that defendant at some point possessed and delivered illegal drugs. In light of the evidence just discussed, that testimony was unlikely to have affected the outcome of defendant's trial.

Second, Bassett testified that he regularly purchased drugs from defendant during the period from June or July 1993 through December 1993. That testimony is significant, because it independently could have supported defendant's conviction. It follows that the risk of prejudice from the erroneous exclusion of impeachment evidence against Bassett was significant.

However, Bassett was only one of four witnesses called by the state, and neither of the charges against defendant were supported solely by his testimony. Three other witnesses testified that defendant regularly had possessed and delivered drugs between March 1 and December 3, 1993. It also is significant that drugs were found in defendant's jacket at the time of his arrest. Finally, defendant's hasty admission to Nafziger that he had participated in a drug sale, although quickly retracted, also could have supported defendant's conviction.

It also is significant that other witnesses corroborated Bassett's testimony that he had bought drugs from and used drugs with defendant. First, Woodruff testified that Aerni had told him that defendant was the drug dealer in town and that she regularly had bought methamphetamine from him. Second, Aerni testified that she and Bassett had obtained drugs from defendant and regularly had used the drugs together.

Based upon that independent evidence of defendant's guilt and the testimony corroborating Bassett's allegations, we conclude that the erroneous exclusion of the impeachment evidence concerning Bassett was not likely to have affected the outcome of this case below. It follows that the trial court's error was harmless. Compare Hubbard, 297 Or at 802 (exclusion not harmless error when no additional testimony supported defendant's conviction).

The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the circuit court are affirmed.

1. On review, the state argues that, in addition to holding the evidence to be irrelevant under OEC 401, the trial court "implicitly" determined that the evidence was cumulative and confusing under OEC 403. The record does not support that assertion. Also, we do not consider the state's additional argument that the trial court's exclusion of the evidence was, at most, harmless error, because the evidence would have been excluded as cumulative under OEC 403. Our harmless error analysis on review of a trial court's determination of relevance under OEC 401 does not include discretionary rulings the trial court could have made under OEC 403.

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