FILED: January 26, 2000
MARTIN PLOTKIN, ROBIN PLOTKIN,
O. MEREDITH WILSON, JR., and
THEODORA ANNE WILSON,
Petitioners - Cross-Respondents,
v.
WASHINGTON COUNTY and BOB POWNE,
Respondents - Cross-Petitioners.
Judicial Review from Land Use Board of Appeals.
Argued and submitted September 23, 1999.
Jeffrey M. Batchelor argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioners - cross-respondents Plotkin and Wilson.
Alan A. Rappleyea, Sr. Assistant County Counsel, filed the brief for respondent - cross-petitioner Washington County.
Stuart K. Cohen argued the cause for respondent - cross-petitioner Powne. With him on the brief was Copeland, Landye, Bennett and Wolf.
Before Landau, Presiding Judge, and Deits, Chief Judge, and Kistler, Judge.
KISTLER, J.
Affirmed on petition; on cross-petitions, reversed and remanded with instructions to affirm the county's decision.
Deits, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
KISTLER, J.
Petitioners appealed to LUBA from a Washington County hearings officer's preliminary approval of a 12-lot residential subdivision on a five-acre parcel. The parcel is located in an area that is designated "wildlife habitat" and that contains two wetland areas that have not been identified as resource lands in the county's comprehensive plan documents. LUBA rejected petitioners' contentions that the county's decision was inconsistent with provisions of its Community Development Code (CDC) requiring preservation of fish and wildlife habitat areas and setting certain dimensional requirements for residential developments. LUBA also rejected petitioners' arguments that the county's findings in connection with the foregoing provisions are not supported by substantial evidence in the whole record. LUBA, however, agreed with petitioners' argument that the county had erred in concluding that the proposed subdivision was not subject to the CDC provision regulating development in "riparian zones." Consequently, LUBA remanded the county's decision. Petitioners seek review and the county and respondent Powne cross-petition, each seeking reversal of the part or parts of LUBA's decision that are adverse to their positions.
Petitioners' arguments to us require little discussion. Their only assignment
of error is that LUBA erred in holding that "there was substantial evidence in the record
to support the hearings officer's conclusion that [the] proposed development complies
with the Community Plan and the [CDC]." The arguments that petitioners advance under
this assignment combine legal and evidentiary assertions that pertain to both the
dimensional and the habitation preservation requirements. Given their assignment of
error and the substance of their arguments, however, petitioners can prevail only if they
succeed in demonstrating that LUBA erred in holding that the county's adverse findings
were supported by substantial evidence in the whole record. Petitioners do not make that
demonstration. See Cusma v. City of Oregon City, 92 Or App 1, 757 P2d 433 (1988).
The county's and Powne's cross-petitions present a more complicated
question.(1) CDC 422 regulates "significant natural resources" and provides, in relevant
part:
"422-2 Lands Subject to this Section
"Those areas identified in the applicable Community Plan or the
Rural/Natural Resource Plan Element as Significant Natural Resources.
"Significant Natural Resources have been classified in the
Community Plans or the Rural/Natural Resource Plan Element by the
following categories:
"422-2.1 Water Areas and Wetlands - 100 year flood plain,
drainage hazard areas and ponds, except those already
developed.
"422-2.2 Water Areas and Wetlands and Fish and Wildlife
Habitat - Water areas and wetlands that are also fish
and wildlife habitat.
"422-2.3 Wildlife Habitat - Sensitive habitats identified by the
Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife, the Audubon
Society Urban Wildlife Habitat Map, and forested
areas coincidental with water areas and wetlands.
"422-2.4 Significant Natural Areas - Sites of special
importance, in their natural condition, for their
ecologic, scientific, and educational value.
"422-3 Criteria for Development
"* * * * *
"422-3.3 Development Within a Riparian Zone, Water Areas
and Wetlands, and Water Areas and Wetlands and Fish
and Wildlife Habitat:
"A. No new or expanded alteration of the
vegetation or terrain of the Riparian Zone (as
defined in Section 106) or a significant water
area or wetland (as identified in the applicable
Community Plan or the Rural/Natural Resource
Plan Element) shall be allowed [subject to
exceptions.]"
(Underscoring in original; emphasis added.)
Petitioners argue that the wetlands on the proposed development area are
"riparian zones" that are subject to the developmental restrictions of CDC 422-3.3A.
Conversely, the county argues that section 422 as a whole is applicable only to wetlands
and other natural resources that, unlike those in question, have been identified as such
through the Goal 5 process and, resultingly, have been designated as such in the county's
comprehensive plan documents. It follows, the county reasons, that the restrictions in
CDC 422-3 are inapplicable.
LUBA agreed with petitioners' interpretation. Although LUBA recognized
that petitioners' interpretation was "somewhat awkward," it reasoned that their
interpretation would do "far less damage to the language of CDC 422 than the
interpretation offered by the county * * *, which would require essentially ignoring the
references to Riparian Zones in CDC 422-3.3."
Because the context provides perspective on the text of CDC 422-3.3A, we
begin with that subsection's context before turning to its text.(2) See PGE v. Bureau of
Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 611, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) (both text and context may
be examined at the first stage of analysis). As the county explains, CDC 422-2
specifically provides that the significant natural resources that are subject to the
regulations and the protections of the "section" are those that are "identified" in the
relevant component or components of the comprehensive plan. It does not appear to be
disputed--and our review of the structure of the CDC at our disposal confirms--that the
term "section" refers to CDC 422 in its entirety. Hence, lands that are not identified in
the plan, and that are therefore outside the regulatory ambit that CDC 422-2 defines, are
not subject to regulation under CDC 422-3.3A or any other subsection of CDC 422.
The text of CDC 422-3.3A does not fit neatly within that context. As noted
above, that subsection is intended to protect specified natural resources from
development. It provides that, subject to certain specified exceptions, "[n]o new or
expanded alteration of the vegetation or terrain of the Riparian Zone (as defined in
Section 106) or a significant water area or wetland (as identified in the applicable
Community Plan or the Rural/Natural Resource Plan element) shall be allowed * * *."
The text can be read in one of two ways. It could be read, as LUBA did, to say that only
those wetlands that are listed in a community plan will be protected from development
but all riparian zones, regardless of whether they are listed in a community plan, will be
protected. Read that way, however, CDC 422-3.3A would protect unlisted riparian
zones, contrary to the larger design of CDC 422, which contemplates that only listed
resources will be protected.
A second reading is textually permissible. CDC 422-3.3A protects riparian
zones "as defined in Section 106" of the Code. Section 106 in turn defines a "riparian
zone" as "[t]he area, adjacent to a water area, which is characterized by moisture
dependent vegetation." CDC 106.185.(3) In light of that definition, CDC 422-3.3A can be
read as applying only to wetlands identified in a community plan and adjacent riparian
zones; that is, the reference to riparian zones in CDC 422-3.3A does not extend
protection to all riparian zones regardless of whether they are listed in a community plan.
Rather, the reference makes clear that if a wetland or water area is listed in a community
plan, then the adjacent moisture dependent vegetation, as defined in section 106, will
also be protected from development.
LUBA declined to adopt the second interpretation, which the county
advanced, because it concluded that the county's interpretation failed to give effect to the
term "riparian zones" as used in CDC 422-3.3A. We disagree. The county's
interpretation simply recognizes that the regulation of riparian zones in CDC 422-3.3A is
limited in the same way that all of the regulations in the section are limited. They apply
only to resource areas that are identified in the plan. Not only does the county's
interpretation give effect to the term "riparian zones," but it is also consistent with the
context in which the county placed that term.
As noted above, CDC 422, as a whole, is directed at protecting listed
resources. Listing a resource in a community plan both reflects the county's judgment
that the resource is significant and provides protection for listed areas against
development. If the unlisted water area is not significant enough in the county's view to
deserve protection, it is somewhat awkward, as LUBA acknowledged, to interpret the
county's ordinance to say that an unlisted adjacent riparian zone is. To be sure, the
county could have chosen to protect riparian zones without regard to whether they are
listed, but including the term within a section devoted to protecting listed resources
demonstrates that the county's rather than petitioner's interpretation is the correct one.(4)
The county's interpretation of CDC 422 is also consistent with our cases
that have addressed the application of statewide planning Goal 5--which CDC 422
implements--in situations analogous to this one. In Dept. of Transportation v. Douglas
County, 157 Or App 18, 22, 967 P2d 901 (1998), we adhered to our earlier decision in
Urquhart v. Lane Council of Governments, 80 Or App 176, 721 P2d 870 (1986), and
summarized it as holding
"that LUBA lacked authority, in reviewing a local plan amendment that
allowed or facilitated a nonresource use, to consider whether Goal 5
required that the area in question be added to the county's inventory under
that goal. We explained that the area had not been included in the
previously acknowledged Goal 5 inventory, that the area had been
'excluded from the inventory before the [plan] amendment was enacted,'
and that any reassessment of the area's omission from the inventory must
occur during [the Land Conservation and Development Commission's]
periodic review of the locality's compliance with the goals rather than in
the appeal from a particular land use decision that was consistent with the
acknowledged inventory as it stood."(5)
Our decision in Urquhart does not compel the adoption of the county's interpretation, but
it confirms that the county's interpretation is consistent with the goals reflected in both
CDC 422 and Goal 5. In sum, we agree with the county that CDC 422, by its own terms
and in keeping with the statewide goal that it implements, applies only to resource lands
that have been inventoried pursuant to Goal 5 and identified accordingly in the county's
acknowledged plan documents. Because the wetland areas in question are therefore not
subject to CDC 422, LUBA erred in reaching the contrary conclusion.
Affirmed on petition; on cross-petitions, reversed and remanded with
instructions to affirm the county's decision.
DEITS, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority's disposition and reasoning on the petition. On the
cross-petition, however, I agree with LUBA that the developmental restrictions in
riparian zones under CDC 422-3.3 are applicable here, and I dissent from the majority's
holding that LUBA erred in that respect.
The essence of the majority's reasoning is that the regulations in CDC 422-3.3
are limited by and coextensive with the types of resources and resource areas that CDC
422-2 enumerates and describes as being identified in the county's comprehensive plan.
However, CDC 422-3.3 expressly includes "riparian zones" among the areas for which it
establishes developmental criteria, notwithstanding the fact that riparian zones are not
among the types of areas that are referred to in CDC 422-2 as being identified in the
plan. Moreover, CDC 422-3.3 describes the "riparian zones" it contemplates as those
"defined in [CDC] 106," a section of the county land use regulations, while the other
types of areas that are subject to CDC 422-3.3 are described in it as ones that are
"identified in the applicable [comprehensive plan documents]." (Emphasis added.)
I therefore agree with LUBA that the county's interpretation, and now the
majority's here, renders the term "riparian zones" in CDC 422-3.3 meaningless. That
interpretation is not only contrary to the principle of statutory construction that legislative
language should not be treated as superfluous and a nullity. It is also contrary to
common sense. Why would the persons who enacted the ordinance have expressly
included "riparian zones" in CDC 422-3.3 if not to regulate them in accordance with the
express terms of that subsection? Indeed, that is precisely what CDC 422-3.3, by its own
terms, clearly does.
If, as the majority believes, CDC 422-2 creates any ambiguity, that ambiguity
can as readily be resolved by giving effect to the clear terms of CDC 422-3.3 rather than
by reading CDC 422-2 in a way that substantially eviscerates the other subsection. The
majority acknowledges that CDC 422-3.3 can be interpreted in the way LUBA did and I
would interpret it, and that the intended objective of the subsection is "to protect
specified natural resources from development." ___ Or App at ___ (slip opinion at 4-5).
"Riparian Zones" are among the resource areas that the subsection expressly protects. I
find nothing compelling in the reasons that the majority offers for selecting an
interpretation of the ordinance that disregards that express language and undermines the
legislative intent.
The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion by reliance on Urquhart v. Lane
Council of Governments, 80 Or App 176, 721 P2d 870 (1986). That case holds that the
omission of an area from a locality's acknowledged comprehensive plan or Goal 5
inventory may not be successfully challenged in an appeal from a particular land use
decision that allows a nonresource use in the area. That holding is simply an application
of the general principle that, after acknowledgment, the land use decisions of a local
government are measured for compliance with its plan and land use regulations rather
than the statewide goals. Urquhart has no bearing on the issue here of whether the
county's own acknowledged land use regulation applies according to its terms to a kind
of resource area that is specifically included in the regulation, albeit not in the plan. The
only question here is what the county's land use regulation means. More specifically, the
question is whether the applicable provision, CDC 422, read as a whole, makes the
protection that one of its subsections expressly confers on riparian zones illusory. For
the reasons stated above, I agree with LUBA's answer, and I respectfully dissent.
1. In the balance of this opinion, we will focus on the county's rather than
Powne's arguments. Both are to the same general effect, but the county's are framed in
terms that come closer to reflecting our own view of the dispositive considerations.
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2. In interpreting CDC 422-3.3, we do not defer to the county hearings
officers' interpretation. See Gage v. City of Portland, 319 Or 308, 314-15, 877 P2d 1187
(1994) (the deference owed to county's interpretation of its ordinances does not extend to
a hearings officer's interpretation). Rather, we determine independently what CDC 422-3.3 means. See id.
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3. At a minimum, the riparian zone extends 25 feet from either side of the
water wetland or watercourse's channel. CDC 106.185. If a wetland or watercourse has
no discernible channel, the riparian zone shall be measured "from the center of the
topographic trough, depression or canyon in which it is located." Id.
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4. Petitioners contend, as an alternative to their principal argument, that the
area in question is designated wildlife habitat in the plan; hence, they reason, the property
is identified as a Goal 5 resource area in the plan, and the regulations pertaining to all
resources in CDC 422 are therefore applicable to it. We disagree. Both Goal 5 and CDC
422 are to the clear effect that the various resources and resource sites they contemplate
are to be inventoried, evaluated and regulated separately. To illustrate, Goal 5 allows
local planning jurisdictions, after proper consideration, to afford differing levels of
protection to different identified resources and resource areas. See OAR 660-023-0040.
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5. Like the local legislation in Urquhart, Washington County's land use legislation is acknowledged. We also note that LCDC's current Goal 5 rule, OAR 660-023-0250, contains provisions that are identical in their operational effect to that of our holding in Urquhart.
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